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The Finals are Rigged.
Why Policy is rigging the NBA Finals
This year’s NBA Finals didn’t break the mold. It followed it.
OKC and Indiana didn’t sneak into June. They were built for it. Built through the draft, through discipline, through restraint. Not because the stars aligned — but because the league did.
If you want to understand how we got here, you have to understand what the NBA used to reward… and what it rewards now.
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How the League’s Incentives Have Shifted
⏳ The Mid-90s to Early 2000s: The Dynasty and Free Agency Era
This was the league just coming out of the Jordan era — a time when stars stayed put and front offices ruled by access, not spreadsheets. The CBA was still forming. Luxury tax didn't exist until 2002. There were very few rules around how to assemble or retain talent — and little parity.
The Bulls were a one-of-one, but the infrastructure allowed them to run it back six times.
The Lakers built through trades (Shaq) and the draft (Kobe), then stayed together thanks to Bird Rights.
San Antonio became a dynasty because they drafted Duncan, parked him next to Robinson, and locked everyone in under long-term deals.
The early 2000s saw the rise of “stay-with-your-team” max contracts. The cap was soft, but there were fewer exceptions. Teams that got lucky (a high pick, a marketable star, a good coach) were allowed to run the table.
Power came from continuity.
No apron. No punitive tax. No ring-chasing mid-level free agents. Just a loose structure that let dynasties breathe.
💰 2007–2016: The Superteam Arms Race
Then came a new era — where rules didn’t just allow star consolidation… they practically encouraged it.
LeBron, Wade, and Bosh formed a superteam via coordinated sign-and-trades.
Boston did it via trades and Bird Rights.
The Warriors bent time and space with a one-time cap spike, creating room for Durant.
The Cavs, Clippers, and Rockets paid luxury tax like rent.
The incentives were clear: go top-heavy, fill in the margins, spend if you can afford to.
Luxury tax was more of an accounting fee than a deterrent. And the taxpayer mid-level let already-rich teams scoop up discounted vets every year.
Teams that built organically — think 2010s Pacers, Grizzlies, even OKC post-Harden — were often a tier below. They could contend, but they couldn’t spend through their mistakes.
📈 The Valuation Boom: How the Business Outpaced the Basketball
Here’s the part of the story that rarely gets told:
While the product evolved on the court, the value of owning an NBA team exploded.
In 2001, the average team was worth ~$200M.
By 2010, that number jumped to ~$370M.
In 2020, it crossed $2B.
Today, the average team valuation is $3.85 billion, with the Warriors, Knicks, and Lakers all over $6B.
Why?
Media rights: The NBA turned into a content machine — games, highlights, studio shows, global streaming deals.
Scarcity: Only 30 teams. No expansion in decades. No access for new money — unless a current owner sells.
Centralized growth: League-driven sponsorships, international partnerships, and collective bargaining gave buyers clarity and consistency.
Private equity interest: In recent years, funds and sovereign wealth have been trying to buy into U.S. sports properties. The NBA is still cautious, but even minority shares now go for hundreds of millions.
So, when the NBA adds rules like the second apron or tweaks BRI distribution, it’s not just about fairness.
It’s about protecting the asset class.
A rising franchise value is only sustainable if the business model looks stable. And right now, the NBA’s system is built to keep 30 teams moving upward together — even if the wins and losses aren't evenly distributed.
🔄 2017–2023: Retrenchment and Transition
After the 2016 cap spike fiasco (thanks, new TV deal), the league realized it had a control issue.
The Warriors added KD and made the league feel predetermined.
Mid-tier teams were boxed out of relevance.
Player movement accelerated, but only among top 20 guys.
The 2017 CBA made some minor tweaks (designated veteran extensions, cap smoothing), but it wasn’t enough.
The league was still rewarding star stacking, and punishing everyone else.
🧱 2024: The Second Apron Era Begins
With the newest CBA, the pendulum didn’t just swing back. It was shoved.
The second apron isn’t a tax. It’s a shutdown protocol:
No mid-level exception
No aggregating salaries in a trade
No signing buyout guys
No sending out future picks
No creativity above the line
The league didn’t just make spending harder.
It removed the tools that used to justify spending big in the first place.
Golden State, Phoenix, the Clippers — they didn’t just overspend.
They lost flexibility. They lost optionality. And eventually, they lost.
💼 The Modern Financial Engine
Underneath it all is a structure that’s changed just as much:
Media rights (~$3B/yr → $7B+ soon): shared evenly across all 30 teams
League sponsorships: pooled and distributed centrally
Revenue sharing: cushions smaller markets
BRI (Basketball Related Income): still split 50/50 with players, but it governs the entire system — the cap, the floor, the tax, and more
It doesn’t matter where you play anymore.
You’re not dependent on a local TV deal or regional sponsor to compete.
You’re dependent on whether your front office knows how to operate under constraint.
🏁 What You’re Actually Watching
This isn’t a Cinderella Finals.
It’s a structural outcome — the kind the league has been slowly building toward for a decade.
The system now rewards:
Teams that stay under the tax
Rosters built on rookie-scale contracts
Patience, continuity, and internal growth
It punishes:
Repeated over-the-cap spending
Star-heavy payrolls with no bench
Front offices that got used to loopholes
OKC didn’t hack the system.
Indiana didn’t overperform.
They just adapted faster than everyone else.
And now they’re where the league quietly wanted them to be all along — playing in June, in full view of the results of its own design.
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